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I. INTRODUCTION

The right to exclude others from using a patent has long been a part of
U.S. Patent Law. This right has been criticized by those who think that its
justifications are weak. They point out that even if a patent holder has
unfettered rights to exploit his technology and to be compensated for doing
so, he does not have the right to harm society by refusing to allow his
patented technology to be licensed, and thus prevent further technology
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from being developed in the field in which the original patent was granted.
They find injustice in that all potential improvement inventors are
precluded, absent a license, from being able to seek or use an improvement
patent on the original patent.
Others counter that society is no worse off when a patent holder
exercises his right to exclude. They argue that the technology underlying
any patent would not be known to the public had the original inventor not
applied for the patent. Since no dependent patent would exist without the
original patent, society is no worse off when a patent holder exercises his
right to exclude would-be dependent inventors.
The conclusion as to which side has the better argument in the above
debate depends largely on an individual's view of intellectual property
policy, as well as theory. The presence and nature of compulsory licensing
provisions in the patent code often mark the battleground in the war to
decide whether the near absolute right to exclude should continue to be
protected. This Article argues for a limited compulsory licensing provision
in the area of improvement patents, using policy and theory arguments
based in a Lockean rationale of intellectual property. It posits that in the
context of improvement patents, labor theory requires that compulsory
patent licensing be an integral part of any patent system.
The U.S. Patent System is usually analyzed through the lens of
practical results and/or efficiency. This Article explores a different
analysis by means of labor theory, but comes to conclusions similar to that
of other writers:' that the U.S. Patent Code should allow for more
compulsory patent licensing than it currently does.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part II will give the doctrinal
background about compulsory patent licensing and its role in the
intellectual property regimes of other countries. It will then go on to
discuss compulsory patent licensing in the United States as it currently
stands. Part III will discuss the theory of compulsory patent licensing,
arguing that labor theory is applicable to the scenario presented by an
improvement patent. Part III analysis continues with an application of
labor theory to compulsory patent licensing, ultimately arguing that in the
context of improvement patents, labor theory requires that compulsory
patent licensing be incorporated into the U.S. Patent Code. Part IV will
give a conclusion and some final observations on compulsory patent
licensing.

I. See Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory PatentLicensing in the United States: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 666, 667-68 (1988); Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory
Patent Licensingfor Efficient Use ofInventions, 2001 U. ILL L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2001).
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II. COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING DOCTRINE

A. Basic Definitions
An improvement patent, also referred to as a dependent patent, is
defined as one that cannot be used without infringing an earlier, existing
patent (pioneer patent). A compulsory license occurs when the government
requires a patent holder to license his patent to another. Many licensing
agreements are entered into quite readily between a pioneer patentee and
someone who has invented (and possibly patented) an improvement to the
pioneer invention. These agreements are struck because they are in the best
interests of the parties involved: without a license from the pioneer, the
improvement patentee (improver) can be barred from using his
improvement patent; without a license from the improver, the pioneer
cannot exploit his invention to the fullest by incorporating the
improvement to the pioneering invention.
There are cases, however, in which the pioneer refuses to grant a
license. Sometimes, a pioneer will refuse to license even if he is not using
the invention. The general law in the United States, absent antitrust
concerns, allows the pioneer to exclude regardless of whether the patent
is being used.2 This Article deals only with the scenario where a pioneer
refuses to grant a license to an improver, and makes arguments that
compulsory patent licensing should be allowed, regardless of whether the
pioneer is using the patent.
B. InternationalTreatment of Compulsory PatentLicensing
Article 5 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, an international agreement of which the United States is a
member, states that members of the convention may provide for
compulsory licensing of patents in order to prevent patent abuse.3
Specifically mentioned as an example of patent abuse is the failure to
work.4 In addition to other limitations, the Paris Convention gives a time
period of non-use before compulsory licensing is allowed, and also
requires that a compulsory license be refused if the patentee "justifies his

2. See Yosick, supra note 1, at 1281.
3. Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Sept. 5, 1970, art. 5, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
4. Id. art. 5(A)(2).
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inaction by legitimate reasons."' The Paris Convention does not have any
specific provisions that relate to compulsory patent licensing, although
denial of a license to an improver may be considered "patent abuse."
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs) came about as a result of The Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993. TRIPs places
further limitations on compulsory patent licensing under Article 31, which
requires the following: each case must be considered on its merits; that the
applicant has attempted to obtain a license from the patentee; that the
license is non-exclusive and non-assignable; that the use is primarily for
the domestic market; and that the patent holder receives adequate
remuneration.6 Most important to this Article is the provision made for
improvement patents. The agreement states that a compulsory license may
be granted in the context of an improvement patent "where such use is
authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent (the second patent) which
cannot be exploited without infringing another patent (the first patent)." 7
The following conditions apply:
(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an
important technical advance ofconsiderable economic significance
in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent;
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-license
on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the second
patent; and
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be nonassignable except with the assignment of the second patent.8
It is noteworthy that while TRIPs does not mandate any of these
provisions, many of the industrialized nations have followed the language
of Article 31 and made provisions for the grant of compulsory patent
licenses, both in the context of nonuse of a patent as well as the instance
of an improvement patent. The United Kingdom, for example, allows for
a compulsory license (as well as an accompanying cross license) when the
improvement patent represents an "important technical advance of

5. Id. art. 5(A)(4).
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs Agreement].
7. Id. art. 31(!).
8. Id. art. 31 ()(i)-(iii).

A LOCKEAN APPROACH TO THE COMPULSORYPATENT LICENSING CONTROVERSY

considerable economic significance." 9 Other countries that do not have
specific compulsory licensing provisions for improvement patents may
nonetheless provide for it in other broadly written laws. Japan and
Germany, for example, allow for compulsory patent licensing when
permission to use the patent is in the "public interest."" °
Among industrialized nations, the United States allows considerably
less compulsory patent licensing than other countries. The commonality
of such provisions is underscored by their presence in the TRIPs
agreement, which allows, but does not require, countries to provide for
compulsory patent licensing of improvement patents. In order to
understand the unique nature of the U.S. approach, a brief analysis of U.S.
compulsory patent licensing follows.
C. Compulsory PatentLicensing in the United States
In Hartford-Empirev. United States,' the U.S. Supreme Court stated
that a patent owner "has no obligation to use [the patent] or to grant its use
to others." Congress has refused to impose any contrary obligation, and
attempts to do so are met with strong criticism. Critics complain that
compulsory patent licensing discourages invention 2 and that it amounts
to "socialism run rampant.' 13 Because so many view encouraging
invention as the main purpose of the patent system,' 4 these criticisms have
prevented formation of compulsory patent licensing provisions. Only in
the areas of atomic energy and air pollution control has Congress made
specific provisions for compulsory patent licensing. 5 While these
provisions show that Congress is willing to at least consider some form of
narrowly tailored compulsory patent licensing, the fact that these
provisions deal only with the important areas of public health and nuclear
energy underscores United States hesitancy on this issue.

9. Patents Act of 1977, §§ 48, 48A(1)(b)(i), (4), (c) (2004) (Eng.).
10. See 2F JOHN P. SNNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, JAPANESE PATENT LAW
OF 1959, art. 93(1) (as amended through May 6, 1998) (2001); 2D JOHN P. SINNOTT, WORLD
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 15 (2001).
11. 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
12. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT, SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS - A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

(Comm. Print 1958).
13. William H. Beckett & Richard M. Merriman, Will the Patent Provisionsof the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954 Promote Progressor Stifle Invention?, 37 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 38, 59 (1955)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 83-2181, at 99 (1954)).
14. EDITH PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 31 (1951).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2183(c) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2004).
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One area where compulsory patent licensing has taken hold somewhat,
albeit not on the legislative side, is in the area of antitrust. Because the
patent grant creates a monopoly of sorts, misuse of that grant can lead to
a grant of judicially crafted compulsory license to competitors. This
concept was visited in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 6 where the Ninth Circuit pointed out the patentee's right of exclusion
is not absolute. 7 The circuit court stated that the right of exclusion cannot
include attempts to extend the monopoly beyond the grant of the patent.18
Defendant Kodak did just that and ran afoul of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
accordirig to the circuit court, when it refused to sell or license patented
parts for its photocopy machines to independent service organizations. 9
The case was criticized by scholars for being the first time that a court
forced a patentee to license a valid patent after a unilateral refusal to sell
or license.2° Most interesting for purposes of this Article is the circuit
court's concern with expansion of compulsory patent licensing. While
compulsory patent licensing was granted as a remedy, the circuit court
states that the decision was based in part on "Kodak's failure to
strenuously assert its patent rights as a defense from the beginning,"
suggesting that better arguments as to the right to refuse to license to
others may have swung the case in Kodak's favor.2
The decision in Image TechnicalServices has been called into question
by other courts, reflecting further hostility for compulsory patent licensing.
In In Re IndependentService OrganizationsAntitrustLitigation,22 on facts
similar to those in Image TechnicalServices, the federal circuit upheld the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant Xerox. The
federal court held that, even where an anticompetitive effect is present, an
infringer must prove that one of two conditions are met in order for the
patentee's right to exclude to be overcome: that the litigation was a mere
sham or that the patentee was obtained fraudulently." a The federal court
also distinguished Image Technical Services, stating that there was no
evidence of illegal tying of patented parts to unpatented parts in this case.2 4

16. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
17. Id. at 1215-16.
18. Id. at 1216.
19. Id.
20. Michael H. Kaufinann, Note, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.:
Taking One Step Forwardand Two Steps Back in Reconciling IntellectualPropertyRights and
Antitrust Liability, 34 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 471, 529 (1999).
21. Id. at 528.
22. 203 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
23. See id. at 1326.
24. See id. at 1327.
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This decision has been characterized as indicative of the general trend in
the United States with regards to compulsory patent licensing: that it has
fallen out of favor.25
Upon comparing the approach of the United States with that of other
industrialized nations, one may wonder if any theory of intellectual
property justifies the U.S. position on compulsory patent licensing. The
next part of this Article is designed to explore that topic and discuss the
theoretical underpinnings of compulsory patent licensing.
III. COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING THEORY

This part of the Article will discuss the theory behind compulsory
patent licensing through the lens of labor theory. It will begin with a brief
introduction of labor theory, and then discuss why labor theory, long
considered a secondary motivation for U.S. Patent Law, has advantages
over other theories. It will then discuss how labor theory applies,
beginning with an analysis of the reward that labor theory justifies, then
moving onto a discussion of how to frame the commons, then ending with
a discussion of how to properly frame appropriation of intellectual
property. Throughout this part of the Article, theoretical as well as
doctrinal applications of compulsory patent licensing will be discussed in
an effort to support the thesis of the Article: that labor theory requires that
compulsory patent licensing be incorporated into the U.S. Patent Code.
A. Introduction to Labor Theory
Locke's analysis of property begins with God's grant of the commons,
which is a state of nature in which goods are held in common. 21 It is up to
the individual to convert these goods to private property, and thereby
appropriate them, by exerting labor upon them. Because there are enough
unclaimed goods, at least in a primitive state, everyone can appropriate the
goods upon which their labor is exerted without impinging on goods that
others have appropriated 7
Allowing appropriation of things with which people have mixed their
labor, according to Locke, "increases the common stock of mankind,"2 an

25. See generallyDavid A. Balto & Andrew W. Wolman, IntellectualPropertyandAntitrust:
Basic Principles,43 IDEA 395, 409-10 (2003).
26. See JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
§ 25 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967).
27. Id. § 33.
28. Id. § 37.
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argument that shows Locke's belief that his theory, while focused on the
individual, is also justifiable from the standpoint of social utility. Locke
takes further care to protect those other than the laborer (a form of social
utility) with his two provisos, both of which must be present in order for
his theory to be justified. The first, referred to as the sufficiency proviso,
requires that "enough and as good" be left in the commons from which
others can draw.2 9 The second, referred to as the spoilage proviso, places
the condition that things appropriated not go to waste.30
Scholars have debated whether intellectual property is property at all, 3'
and the extent to which Locke's theory should be applied to intellectual
property given its original application.3" Locke's writings on labor are
limited to real property, in the sense that his examples and explanations
refer to real property only. Labor theory has been extended to include
intellectual property by subsequent scholars, many of whom argue that
Locke's theory applies just as readily to intellectual property as it does to
real property.33 This could be because Locke's writing concerned the wider
philosophy of the nature of government,3 4 the administrator of intellectual
property regimes throughout the world. Another possible explanation for
the application of Locke's theory to intellectual property may be found in
the intuitive appeal of the propositions that intellectual creation requires
labor, and that the production and appropriation of ideas can readily satisfy
both Lockean provisos. 35 The next section of this Article will incorporate
this reasoning in arguing that labor theory is applicable to intellectual
property, in addition to extolling some of the advantages that is has over
other theories.
B. Why Labor Theory Should Apply
The main focus of labor theory is on the individual rather than on
general societal welfare or practical considerations. Any application of
29. Id. § 27.
30. Id. § 37.
31. See Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Propertyis Property?, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993).
32. See generally PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996)
(arguing that if Locke has a theory of property, it should not apply to intellectual property); EATON
S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1879) (arguing that labor theory is applicable to intellectual
property).
33. See Adam D. Moore, IntellectualProperty: Theory, Privilege,andPragmatism,16 CAN.
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 191, 209 (2003).
34. DRAHOS, supra note 32, at 47.
35. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property,77 GEO. L.J. 287, 300 (1988).
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theory to intellectual property rights should focus on individuals because
they are essential to the process of invention. Without the inventor, there
is no invention. Therefore, intellectual property regimes should be
concerned with rewarding inventors in a manner that is fair. Any system
that does not focus on the individual, but instead focuses on general
societal welfare, runs a greater risk of treating inventors less fairly.
Fairness to inventors, in the form of carefully determined intellectual
property rights, will not harm society and may even help it. Other
applications of theory might place greater emphasis in societal welfare or
practical consequence, but in placing their focus elsewhere, these theories
run the risk that the inventor may receive an award that is less than what
he contributes, thereby discouraging people from laboring. Further, the
two goals of rewarding the inventor and ensuring the benefit to society are
not mutually exclusive. They may even be complementary, as Locke
seemed to believe and as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in the
landmark case Mazer v. Stein:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors ...
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered.36
Stated differently, if inventor talents are neglected through an intellectual
property system that is less than fair in its rewards to the inventor, a suboptimal system for the creation of works results. Labor theory, with its eye
on fairness to the inventor, is best suited to avoid this problem.
One possible counterargument to the above line of reasoning is that
many creators of intellectual works do not create because of a desire to
receive a just reward, but rather to benefit society or gain fulfillment
through self-expression. In fact, it is likely that any given inventor has a
host of different motivations for laboring over his intellectual creation.
This fact is used to question the validity of incentive theory, which is often
used to justify intellectual property rights in the United States. Labor
theory, however, may provide an answer, in that any inventor who is not
motivated by the desire to receive what is deemed by society to be a "fair"
property right is free to express that motivation, by simply choosing not to
appropriate that information for which he labored.

36. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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There may be a question as to whether appropriation constitutes an
independent act that the laborer chooses to perform as opposed to it being
an unavoidable consequence of labor itself. But just as property owners are
free to abandon their land, intellectual property holders may exercise the
right of abandonment with respect to their intellectual creations. Overall,
labor theory better deals with the conundrum presented by varying
incentive levels by focusing on the individual's right, of which no inventor
is required to take advantage, rather than trying to generalize the
motivations of any particular inventor. That said, this Article will assume
that most inventors will act in their own best interest in seeking a just
reward for their intellectual labor.
Another assumption commonly made in the explanation as to why
labor theory applies to intellectual property is that the creation of
patentable subject matter involves Lockean labor. Justin Hughes points out
that this might not be so, that Locke envisioned labor becoming property
because the energy, consciousness, and control that fuel our labor are also
our property.37 Ideas might not be capable of being property, especially
when they do not require our energy, consciousness, or control, and even
more so when they come about as a result of "huge scales of research,"
which pushes idea-making closer to mechanical labor and thus further
from what Locke envisioned.38
While Hughes's point is well taken, his other examples of ideas coming
about as a result of great mental labor, such as the complete plans to a
suspension bridge and a scholar's research-enriched dissertation, are
compelling enough to justify the assumption made. 39 The same assumption
was expressed by Eaton Drone, who argued that ownership is created by
production. Because ideas are produced by none other than our own
person, which is surely our property, they also are our property.40 While
Locke did not apply his theory outside the context of the individual
laborer, that does not necessarily entail that he meant to limit rewards only
to individual laborers. The effects of group labor on the intellectual
commons are just as capable of increasing the "common stock of man" as
any other type of labor. Hughes concedes that Locke's theory, which states
that if the provisos are met there is no good reason not to grant property
rights, is largely ajustification by negation.4 ' The provisos can be satisfied
when a group appropriates adequately as individual laborers. Therefore,

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Hughes, supra note 35, at 302.
Id. at 301.
Id.
DRONE, supra note 32, at 5.
Hughes, supranote 35, at 298.
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even if group intellectual labor of a more mechanical nature is not exactly
what Locke envisioned, it is still capable of an application to labor theory.
Labor theory, which is used to justify receipt of a government
monopoly for mixing one's labor with information, is applicable in the
area of intellectual property because of its concern that inventors be
rewarded fairly. What one receives ought to be fair, meaning that one
should only get what has become, through one's labor, a part of one's self.
It is not fair, therefore, to give a monopoly in information with which an
inventor has not mixed his labor, any more than it is fair to allow someone
to appropriate private property for which no labor has been performed. To
do otherwise would be to inflict harm to other's claim to the commons, a
situation that would run counter to Locke's first law of nature that no harm
be done to others.42 Harm is caused because others who have not labored
have an equal claim to the property appropriated by the original nonlaborer, and by denying them that claim, their ability to labor is impaired.
The above arguments advocate the applicability of labor theory to
intellectual property. Many of the arguments are based on a concept of
fairness that runs throughout Locke's work. Whether or not labor theory
is applicable depends in part on how it is employed to define fairness to
inventors. Crucial to this inquiry is deciding the reward that labor theory
justifies. The next section of the Article explores this topic in greater
detail, and goes into further detail on the application of labor theory itself
to intellectual property generally, and specifically considers the case of
compulsory patent licensing.
C. How Labor Theory Applies
1. Deciding the Reward that Labor Theory Justifies
This Article considers two options when deciding the reward that labor
theory justifies. The first is that labor theory may justify a complete
monopoly over the information patented. The necessary and logical
extension of this reward is that no subsequent inventor can reap rewards
of improvement labor should the pioneer refuse to grant a license. The
labor of the improver can in no way be rewarded by the grant of monopoly
(however limited). The only reward given to the improver is his bargaining
chip to convince the pioneer to grant a license that could be beneficial to

42. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law ofIntellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1561 (1993).
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both parties. Labor theory's concern with the rights of others is discussed
in greater detail in the section on framing the intellectual commons.
Perhaps this situation can be justified by the fact that were it not for the
pioneer, the improver would not have had the ability to labor in any way
to improve the pioneer patent. The broad monopoly reward, therefore, is
perhaps justified because it does not cause any harm to society or to the
improver. But this justification ignores the reality of patents in a modem
society, Where a patent is often granted after a race between various
entities. The U.S. Patent Office regularly adjudicates interference
proceedings when two similar patents have been applied for at nearly the
same time to decide which party has the superior right to the invention
claimed.43 The existence of such a proceeding underscores that many
inventions, if not patented by one party, will shortly thereafter be patented
by another. The losing entity in this patent race is most likely in the best
position to be the improver, and those improvements exist independent of
the winner of the patent race. Therefore, harm is done to the independent
inventor/improver in that he receives no reward at all if the patent holder
refuses to license. Harm is also caused to society because it has to bear the
burden of a long-term monopoly, which was designed to approximate the
amount of time that it would have taken someone else to invent the
patented information,' when a much shorter term would have been the
actual time required for independent invention.
Another possible argument that the patent grant may be overbroad
comes from an analogy to tort law and is posited by Wendy Gordon:
"Once a creator exposes her intellectual product to the public, and that
product influences the stream of culture and events, excluding the public
' Gordon's argument may be weaker in the
from access to it can harm."45
patent context, however, because patented information may be less
reflective of culture than a copyrighted play or novel. Hughes speaks
differently of the effect of exposing an intellectual product to society:
"New idea X may be the key to a whole new range of ideas which would
not have been thought of without X. ' If Hughes is correct, Gordon's
argument loses its muster unless she can articulate the harm in such a way
that it outweighs the great benefit of having access to new lines of ideas.
It may be that a definitive answer as to the reward that labor theory
justifies is elusive by these arguments alone, and must be found elsewhere.
43. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.09[1][a] (2000).
44. R. Anthony Reese, Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectiveson
Copyright Durationand Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707, 722 (1995).
45. Gordon, supranote 42, at 1567.
46. Hughes, supranote 35, at 316.
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Giving a broad monopoly over the information of one's intellectual
product seems especially odd in the face of the requirement of disclosure
of the invention. Disclosure is required as a condition of the patent grant,
and is pointless from the standpoint of an improver who is denied a license
to use the patented invention. There must be some other reason for
requiring disclosure. There is a notice function that serves as a warning to
independent inventors, who have no defense to patent infringement,
although scholars have long argued for such a defense. By giving notice
of what is claimed, the disclosure benefits other inventors because it gives
them the opportunity to "design-around" the pioneer patent. Other
inventors may use the patent as a springboard for finding other solutions
to the problem, as the Hughes quote above notes.
In all of the preceding scenarios, information in the patent is indeed
used, just not in the particular way disclosed by the patent. The monopoly
granted, therefore, is limited to the use of information in the particular
methods claimed in the patent, and does not include the information itself.
The distinction between real and intellectual property is apparent here, as
real property that has been granted to one person is less likely to be used
by another. Perhaps this suggests the limitations in applying labor theory
to intellectual property. Because information is different from real
property in so many ways, a theme that is developed in more detail later
in this Article, complete monopoly over the information patented is not
warranted. The disclosure requirement and subsequent "use" of the
information suggests as much.
Labor theory does not seem to suggest that disclosure is necessary;
neither does it suggest that disclosure runs afoul of its provisions.
Disclosure is, however, quite practical, in addition to being universally
accepted. Since disclosure is such an integral part of patent systems, this
Article assumes it is here to stay and does not engage in arguments about
whether or not it is justified or required by labor theory. Disclosure under
the patent system suggests some understanding of a limitation on the
monopoly granted to the inventor. But this is only true if the other possible
reasons for disclosure discussed above are not a sufficient justification for
the disclosure requirement. Whether they are or not is beyond the scope of
this Article. The point here is to raise the possibility that the disclosure
requirement itself, whether justified by labor theory or not, may lend itself
to justify limiting the monopoly granted to the inventor.

47. See generally ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
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The second option for the reward that labor theory justifies is a
monopoly over the value that the patent adds to society. This is called the
"value-added" theory, which was stated by Lawrence Becker as follows:
"when labor produces something of value to others - something beyond
what morality requires the laborer to produce - then the laborer deserves
some benefit for it."'48 Becker suggests that property rights be justified only
to the extent that value has been added to society. Justin Hughes puts a
further refinement on this theory by stating that "Labor often creates social
value, and it is this production of social value that 'deserves' reward, not
the labor that produced it. ' 49 It is important to recognize that all labor
cannot possibly be rewarded with a property right. Duplicative labor is one
example. Containing the reward for labor to its value added to society is
the best option, especially given Locke's sufficiency and spoilage
provisos, which are arguably designed to ensure such containment.
The provisos are often framed as means of avoiding harm that
potentially ensues with granting property rights.50 The harm flowing from
an overly broad property right that effectively allows a pioneer to exclude
improvers has already been discussed, and will be discussed further in this
Article. Therefore, the provisos, in addition to serving as a threshold to
whether any property right is granted at all, can also be viewed as designed
to avoid harm by limiting the property right itself. This is especially so
with something so difficult to define as the property right in information,
which cannot be acquired in the same sense that real property can be
acquired. Different intellectual property regimes such as patent, trademark,
and copyright, with their varying levels of property right, are potentially
one way in which this difficulty is addressed. These different levels of
property right all involve labor that has added value to society, but are
constrained in different ways by the provisos in an effort to avoid harm.
Because the justified reward flows from the value added, it follows that
the reward cannot exceed the value added. Hughes expresses this in his
normative statement of value-added theory: "People should be rewarded
for how much value they add to other people's lives, regardless of whether
they are motivated by such rewards."'" This in part depends upon the
presumption that no more value can be added to society than labor is
expended. Patents granted on certain discoveries may counter that
presumption, but the norm is still that much work needs to be done in

48. Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of PropertyRights, in PROPERTY, NOMOS XXII,
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order to add value to society. Considering the amount of time and
resources invested by today's research and development companies, it is
safe to say that labor expended will be excessively greater than value
added.
The patent grant, as it is currently constituted, is designed to represent
the value added to society. The patent code's requirements of novelty,
non-obviousness, and operability highlight the validity of the value-added
theory. If any requirement is absent, the invention will lack value to
society because it does not advance the state of the art. Each requirement
raises the threshold of the additional value requirement in its own unique
way. U.S. patent holders who refuse to license to an improver are
effectively allowed to extend their monopoly beyond the patent grant and
bar other new, non-obvious, and operable (and therefore, by and large,
valuable) inventions from coming forth. In doing so, they reap value that
they have not added to society.
This problem is recognized in countries with more liberal compulsory
licensing regimes. They seek to ensure the scope of patent rights by
defining them in terms of value. TRIPs, for example, allows member
countries to provide for the granting of a compulsory license only if, in
addition to other requirements, "the invention claimed in the second patent
shall involve an important technical advance of considerable economic
significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent., 52 By
requiring that considerable value be added before an improver can seek a
compulsory license, the TRIPs framework acknowledges the role that
value plays.
Harm to society is perhaps most stark in the case where only the
improver's patent is commercially feasible. The public would be deprived
of an invention should the U.S. pioneer patentee refuse to license, despite
the fact that the pioneer patentee did not add the required value to bring
forth the invention to a marketable product. The TRIPs framework, if
implemented, would possibly avoid this harm, because improvement
patents that allow reduction of the patent to a commercialized product will
certainly qualify as having the requisite economic significance. There is
a question as to whether an improvement patent that prescribes reduction
of the patent to a commercialized product will always satisfy the
"important technical advance" threshold found in TRIPs Article 31, and
further question as to whether that threshold is greater than that of
patentability under the patent law of that member state. In any event, the

52. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 6, art. 31(I)(i).
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combination of"important technical advance" and "considerable economic
significance" highlights the validity of the value-added theory.
Labor theory stresses that rights should be granted commensurate with
value added to society. One may question why so many patents are granted
on seemingly worthless inventions. Peter Rosenberg makes an interesting
observation on this point:
To satisfy the operability standard, an inventor need not establish
that his invention is better than, or that it is even as good as,
existing means for accomplishing the same result

. .

. [T]he law

does not ask how useful is the invention. A device that may not
operate well may nonetheless be operative.53
Rosenberg is correct to point this out, but only seems to focus on one
aspect of value that can be derived from a patent: that of a patented
product. There is other value to be found in a patent; the advancement of
the state of the art and the use of the patent as a springboard to other ideas
are but two examples. The U.S. approach can therefore be said to be
concerned with value, and uses the imperfect but best way of ensuring it:
novelty, non-obviousness, and enablement. Nonetheless, conflict is
present between the U.S. requirement for patentability and the TRIPs
"value" requirement.
One may question why the requirement of TRIPs is so stringent in
requiring, for those member countries that elect to provide compulsory
patent licensing to improvement patents, that the value threshold for the
improvement be so high. The TRIPs language is probably more in line
with Locke, but arguably requires that the improvement patent generate
too much value. Perhaps the TRIPs language reflects some sympathy
towards the U.S. position that property rights in a patent should only be
disturbed in the most rare of circumstances. The TRIPs framework, if
implemented, would ameliorate some harm, but still leave many improvers
without the benefit of being able to obtain a compulsory license.
The analysis so far leads us to the conclusion that the monopoly,
limited by the value added to society, would not extend to allow a pioneer
to prevent an improver from gaining protection for improvements to the
patent. This result is contemplated under labor theory, which states that an
individual should be entitled to no more than that value which he has
brought about by his labor, represented by the patent grant, which arguably
represents the value given. The Lockean provisos serve as the major

53. 2 P.D. ROSENBERG,
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constraint on property rights in information. A determination of
compliance with the provisos is dependent on the way in which the
intellectual commons is framed. The next section of this Article explains
why this is so, and seeks to frame the intellectual commons. It also will
analyze whether the Lockean provisos are violated by a regime that refuses
to issue compulsory licenses to improvement patents.
2. Framing of the Intellectual Commons
Labor theory dictates that the commons contain that with which man
mixes his labor in order to gain a property right, which is manifested in the
patent grant. The commons is a grant from God to humanity, and is drawn
upon to convert things from their natural state, in which they cannot be
enjoyed, to a different state where they can be enjoyed by human beings. 4
This framework is quite applicable to intellectual creations, where
information is taken from somewhere, worked upon, and then presented
to society as part of the patent grant. This Article considers two options in
deciding how the intellectual commons of labor theory are properly
framed. The first is to define it as everything in the public domain,
meaning all information that is known and can be used freely. The second
option is to frame the commons as what lies just beyond the state of the
art, with the state of the art including information disclosed in patents,
even though this information is not available for use in the particular way
claimed in the patent.
Patentable inventions come from two sources. The first source is what
lies beyond the state of the art. The second comes from new and nonobvious combinations of information that is entirely or in part in the public
domain. This second source of patentable inventions can properly be
viewed as being just beyond the state of the art as well, and therefore is
probably a sub-category of the first source of patentable inventions. While
a patent may be made up entirely of public domain information, the way
in which the public domain elements are combined can qualify an
invention as patentable. The idea that the commons are composed of what
lies beyond the state of the art is reflected in the novelty and nonobviousness requirements in the U.S. Patent System. Any information that
is not novel or that is obvious is part of the current state of the art.
The best approach, therefore, is to frame the commons as what lies just
beyond the state of the art. But why does it matter how the commons are
framed? Because labor theory is thought to be constrained by the Lockean
proviso that "enough and as good" (sufficiency) be left in the commons

54. LOCKE, supra note 26, § 25.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. 9

with which others can mix their labor to receive their own reward. Even
advocates of using labor theory to justify broad intellectual property rights
have acknowledged that the grant of rights is constrained by the Lockean
provisos of sufficiency and spoilage." If the commons are defined as what
is in the public domain, a patent on information in the public domain
(excluding a patentable combination ofpublic domain information) would
not allow for the first Lockean proviso to be met. This is because there is
a finite amount of information that is in the public domain. Therefore, any
removal of information leaves the rest with less, which is certainly not "as
good." If the commons are defined as what is beyond the state of the art,
the sufficiency proviso will likely be met. In order for this to be so, there
needs to be an infinite amount of information (and thus, potential
inventions) to be created such that any removal of information will by
necessity leave "enough and as good" for those who follow. This Article
will assume that an infinite amount of information lies beyond the state of
the art.
Some scholars feel that patent strays from copyright, which seems to
satisfy the sufficiency proviso, in that when a patent is granted, an
inventive step is removed from the commons. Thus, enough and as good
remains after removal of the inventor's originality from the commons, but
removal of the inventive step does not leave enough and as good.56 This
position is weak, however, because it assumes a finite level of inventive
steps in the commons. If inventive steps are indeed a subset of
information, which is infinite, then it follows that there must be an infinite
amount of inventive steps. The ingenuity of inventors, from which
inventive steps are derived, is not likely to run out. Steady increases in the
number of patent applications in the United States seem to suggest as
much.
Peter Drahos develops this theme further: "If the world is more or less
an infinite set of equivalents then it follows . . . that any given
appropriation by an individual of an abstract object would be allowed.""
Drahos later says that the extension of this would lead to the "radical"
implication that a much larger scale of appropriation is justified by Locke.
The example Drahos gives is that someone who labors to discover the
second law of thermodynamics should be allowed to appropriate it. 8 This
depends on exactly what appropriation entails, a theme developed later in

55. See Moore, supra note 33, at 210-11.
56. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyrightfor FunctionalExpression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149,
1224 (1998).
57. DRAHOS, supranote 32, at 50.
58. Id.
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this Article. In any event, Drahos' example would violate the sufficiency
proviso by the nature of what is taken, a law of nature, of which there may
not be a set of equivalents, as opposed to an inventive step, of which there
seems to be no limit.
Once the commons are properly framed, an analysis of compliance
with the provisos can be properly considered. There are various arguments
that the U.S. rejection of compulsory patent licensing violates the
sufficiency proviso. Some of these arguments depend on what happens to
the information that is removed from the commons. It is not part of the
public domain in the purest sense because it cannot be used freely. It can,
however, be used, as pointed previously in this Article. Thus, it follows
that an improvement inventor who has the information of the patent at his
disposal, is only better off by virtue of the patent grant. Acceptance of
others being better off by disclosing the information in the patent assumes
that all known information is held as part of the commons. But, as the
previous section of this Article points out this is not so. The sufficiency
proviso only applies to the commons, and it is there that "enough and as
good" must be left.
The first argument is that there may not be "as good" for an
improvement inventor that seeks to invent with the information that lies
just beyond the state of the art. The state of the art is surely changed when
the information underlying a patent is disclosed. The information
underlying a patent is disclosed presumably for the benefit of those to
whom it is disclosed - the public. This benefit is only realized to its
fullest extent if the public can combine their labor with the information to
make improvements. In this sense, there may not be "as good" because,
even if the commons is not affected by removing from it the information
found in the patent, the state of the art that lies just beyond the patent itself
cannot be explored without fear that the pioneer will refuse to grant a
license. Thus, "as good" is not left for others who wish to improve upon
a patented invention.
This argument assumes that when considering what is "as good," the
reference point-is the state of the commons after the patent is granted. The
commons includes both what is beyond the state of the art as well as new,
non-obvious, and useful combinations of information found in the public
domain. Such a definition may include improvement patents, which are
nothing more than the patent itself combined with information either
beyond the state of the art or within the state of the art in a new, useful,
and non-obvious way. Because information or combination found in
improvement patents is removed from the commons, the sufficiency
proviso, it can be argued, is not met. One counter to this is that if there
really are an infinite number of inventions in the commons waiting to be
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patented, then no matter how many potential improvement patents the
pioneer inventor takes with him when he is granted a property right, there
is "enough and as good" left behind. While the sufficiency proviso is not
much help in this sense, the spoilage provision might be. Since the pioneer
cannot possibly explore all the improvements that are to be made, if he is
given a monopoly over them, he may have taken more than he can put to
use. Some property would, in a sense, be destroyed without being used.59
Regardless of whether or not the provisos are violated, a monopoly over
things not patented is not justified by labor theory.
The above arguments are dependent upon what is referred to in the
literature as the baseline problem. The baseline problem explores what
reference points to use when deciding whether or not the property right
granted causes the harm that the sufficiency proviso is designed to prevent.
Adam Moore argues that the baseline should remain static, and should be
defined as the moment after acquisition of the property versus the moment
before the property is taken. 6' Moore acknowledges the temptation to use
a sliding baseline, stating that "since an individual's level of well being
changes over time the baseline of comparison must also change."' This
forces one to accept that "to determine moral bettering and worsening we
are to compare how individuals are before the creation of some value to
how they would be if they possessed or consumed that value."62 This is
error, according to Moore, because it lends credibility to the overly broad
argument that we are all worse off when value is held exclusively by
anyone.63
Moore may not be so correct in his analysis when it is applied in the
context of compulsory patent licensing. Moore constrains his analysis by
the creation of "some value," and as discussed previously in this Article,
he faces an uphill battle in arguing that improvement patents are part of the
value created by a patent. They arguably only are a part of that value when
the improvement would not have been created were it not for the pioneer
patent. This assertion is dealt with in more depth in other sections of this
Article, so it will be left for now. Further, the argument that the sufficiency
provision is not satisfied by the rejection of compulsory patent licensing
may hold true regardless of whether the baseline is static or dynamic. A
static baseline that leaves an improvement inventor unable to explore what
lies beyond the state of the art, whereas before the patent grant he could
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explore it, certainly includes the "morally relevant changes in well being"
that violate labor theory principles.
There are also various arguments that the U.S. rejection of compulsory
licensing does not violate the sufficiency proviso. The public is left with
"enough and as good" because removing the information from what is
simply beyond the state of the art does not cause the commons to be
diminished. The commons are only changed as the state of the art
advances. Moreover, "enough and as good" can be said to be left to other
laborers because the improvement inventor is no worse off than he would
have been had the pioneer not released the information.
This line of argument, however, ignores the possibility of subsequent
independent invention, where neither "enough" nor "as good" is left to the
subsequent independent inventor. This is achieved once he, through his
labor, much of which was mixed with the commons prior to the grant of
the pioneer patent, advances the now redundant technology to the point of
patentability. This scenario has been used to argue for a lesser patent term
for inventions in some fields where patent races are common." It is
exasperated when a subsequent independent inventor makes an
improvement, and even more so in the rare case where the improvement
is made prior to the grant of the pioneer patent.
Wendy Gordon's argument that once action has begun, inaction can
result in harm, is also applicable here. This is what Moore refers to as a
"dynamic baseline." "That an intellectual product is new, would not have
otherwise existed, and may initially bring benefit to the public, does not
' The harm is that
guarantee that later exclusions from it will be harmless."65
a potential improvement inventor finds himself with neither "enough" nor
"as good" because knowing of the patent affects his thinking in a way that
limits him to finding other technological solutions. This is, as Gordon
admits, essentially a reliance argument: "[H]aving changed people's
position, the inventor cannot then refuse them the tools they need for
surviving under their new condition." While Gordon did not apply her
argument to compulsory patent licensing, it is a good fit. The "change in
position" is a result of the change in the state of the art of the information
underlying the patent. Refusal of a license is an example of the tools that
one would need in order to acquire property, and thus survive. The harm
of creation of a reliance and subsequent denial, as well as violation of the
proviso, can therefore be avoided by allowing compulsory patent
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licensing. The U.S. system, as seen above in Part II of this Article, falls
short in this regard.
The analysis so far leads to the conclusion that compulsory patent
licensing ought to be accepted by Lockean theory. There are, however,
other reasons for compulsory patent licensing's acceptance. They are
discussed in the following section of this Article. They are somewhat more
policy based, and explore both the point at which appropriation of
intellectual property is justified by labor theory, as well as how
appropriation is limited by what is being appropriated.
3. Framing of Appropriation
Appropriation occurs where someone mixes their labor with
information in the commons and takes that information for himself. This
can be done in various ways, one of which is to receive legal protection in
the form of a patent for that information which is appropriated. Many labor
theorists view such legal protection as the just reward for the laborer's
efforts in mixing his labor with information. This section of the Article
deals with two principal issues relating to appropriation. The first involves
the circumstances under which appropriation is appropriate. The second
explores how information, by its nature, limits what an intellectual laborer
ought to be able to appropriate. The analysis on both counts will be based
in compulsory patent licensing.
Some scholars believe that appropriation is permitted only to allow
property to reach its full use.67 Locke may have had full use in mind when
explaining his spoilage proviso. Many items by their very nature cannot
be put to their full use if they are appropriated. One example is found in
the laws of nature, which are so broad and are used as a basis for so many
inventions that limiting access to them would keep them from their full
use, which may include serving as the basis for other inventions. Drahos'
argument that Lockean theory, if taken to the limits that are often
suggested, might require granting intellectual property rights to the laborer
who discovers the second law of thermodynamics meets an end here.
While the laborer has surely added value to society through his labor, the
provisos are not satisfied when a law of nature is appropriated. Sufficiency
is not left behind for others, who may not be able to labor in areas beyond
the state of the art, and the waste associated with the limitations of being
the only person with the exclusive right to develop the law of nature is too
great.

67. See Seana Shiffrin, Lockean Argumentsfor PrivateIntellectualProperty,in NEw ESSAYS
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The policy goal of ensuring that property reaches its full use is,
according to Seanna Shiffrin, buoyed by the fact that the "world is initially
held in common by all people."6 In order to reach its full use, some
information must be held in common. According to Shiffrin, allowing such
information to be held by many highlights the importance of the common
grant of the world,69 an idea held by Locke as an important part of his
theory on labor. Regardless of whether or not Shiffrin's belief that Locke
envisioned the world to be held in common is correct, her argument that
property ought to be put to full use is compelling. While this seems to be
more of a practical consideration than anything Lockean, it is not
inconsistent with labor theory, especially because the provisos, in
particular that of spoilage, seem designed to encourage property's full use.
Labor theory may not require full use as a condition to appropriate, but it
does dictate that full use will be made of whatever is appropriated. It is
important to distinguish between non-wasteful possession, which is what
the spoilage proviso is designed to prevent, and full use. It is quite possible
that property being held exclusively by one person might not reach its full
use, but spoilage will also fail to occur. The exact level of use that labor
theory requires is not considered here. It is only pointed out that the
spoilage proviso is concerned with the level of use, and plausible
arguments can be made that full use is contemplated by Locke. An
argument that labor theory requires full use in the area of information
might be stronger than in the realm of real property given the unique
nature of information. This is because information by its nature is more
prone to waste when held exclusively.
Appropriation of information is different than appropriation of tangible
things, because information is different. Even when appropriated, it can be
discovered by another or secretly used by another without any legal
implications. Further, information, unlike land, need not be owned
exclusively in order to be put to its full use. Full use may occur
independent of whether or not the information is appropriated. These
characteristics of information limit what is appropriated, because if they
can reach their full use in other ways, or even if they are less likely to spoil
if not appropriated, then the justification for allowing private ownership
is not as strong. This is what Shiffrin is getting at when she states that the
first condition necessary to justify a person's appropriation of something
is that "things of that sort must be susceptible to justified private
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ownership."7° Information, for the aforementioned reasons, is an example
of something that is less susceptible to private ownership.
Appropriation is thus limited by what is being appropriated. Any
intellectual property system that grants to the appropriator the right to
exclude others from use under every circumstance goes too far.
Information must be more fully exploited in order to reach its full use, and
overly broad rights have the potential to hamper that full use. "Wasteful
appropriation would frustrate the charge to make the common grant work
to humankind's benefit."'" Although something less than full use might
have been tolerated by Locke in order to ensure the just reward for valueadding labor, waste is certainly to be avoided. Shiffrin argues that
information is more susceptible to waste when it is under exclusive
control: "Attempts to control, suppress, manipulate, or monopolize ideas
and information run counter to the intellectual spirit of open public
discussions that promote learning and appreciation for the truth."72
Compulsory patent licensing in the context of improvement patents
should be allowed because it facilitates full use, or at the very least more
use, especially when there is nonuse of the patent. Allowing complete
control over the information in the pioneer patent as part of appropriation
can prevent information from reaching its full use. Information that cannot
be used to bring forth other ideas and inventions is not being put to its full
use. One of the unique characteristics of knowledge, and something else
that sets it apart from real property, is its ability to beget more of itself.
The difference between real and intellectual property is again evident. The
full use of real property is often a unique characteristic of information that
is opposed to real property, the full use of which is often reached by
exclusion of others. Some pioneer patents may even have some of the
characteristics of the laws of nature in that they can form the basis for
many other types of inventions, and it would be impossible for the patent
holder to explore all the possible areas of application that the patent might
have.
In conclusion, Locke's concern with avoiding spoilage, and his
possible desire to ensure full use, cuts in favor of Congress placing a
provision for compulsory patent licensing in the U.S. Patent Code.
Compulsory licenses allow inventors to ensure that their labor is not
wasted by a pioneer's refusal to license. The unique nature of information
only serves to strengthen the claim that the United States should take
action in this regard. Improvement patents should be viewed as a
70. Id. at 143.
71. Id. at 147.
72. Shiffrin, supra note 67, at 156.
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consequence of information's ability to give rise to more knowledge.
Allowing improvement patents to come forth more readily by this means
is required by labor theory, and only serves to strengthen the common
stock of mankind.

IV. CONCLUSION

Various issues need to be taken into consideration in deciding whether
labor theory requires compulsory licensing of improvement patents. The
first is an inquiry into the validity of labor theory itself as it relates to the
creation and appropriation of intellectual works. The analysis above, in
addition to arguing that labor theory is indeed applicable, shows that labor
theory has some particular advantages over other theories. Once it is
determined that labor theory is applicable, it remains to be seen how that
theory should be applied. The fact that labor theory has been thoroughly
discussed by many different scholars in many fields suggests that any
conclusion reached might be easily refutable. Even so, this Article
concludes that labor theory is applicable to compulsory patent licensing
theory in that, if properly applied, labor theory requires a substantive
change to U.S. law.
This thesis is supported by analyzing labor theory in three main areas.
The first is the reward that labor theory justifies. Because a property right
is the reward for labor, the assumption is that if labor theory is applied,
expansive property rights are granted. Locke, however, intended that the
property right granted be attuned to the value added to society by virtue of
the labor exerted. This value serves as a constraint on the property right
granted in the patent. It prevents a pioneer from being able to deny a
license to an improver by virtue of the fact that the value added only
extends as far as the pioneer patent itself, and not into the value of the
improvement patent.
The second area of analysis deals with the intellectual commons and
how they should be defined in applying labor theory to intellectual works.
The commons are best defined as all information that lies just beyond the
state of the art. By removing information from the commons, an inventor
changes the state of the art and causes the appropriated information to
become the state of the art. In refusing to license to an improver, the
pioneer effectually bars the improver from developing information beyond
the state of the art. This is in violation of Locke's sufficiency proviso.
Furthermore, the spoilage proviso may be violated if the pioneer is given
the right to exclude would be inventors because the pioneer may not be

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[Vol. 9

able to make sufficient use of the property. Only by requiring licenses for
holders of improvement patents can the provisos be met.
The third area of analysis is that of the appropriation of property itself.
The nature of information warrants that it be put to its full use, and this is
more likely to occur when there are many people with access to that
information who intend to work with it. The unique nature of information
limits what is appropriated because of information's tendency to go to
waste when held exclusively. Compulsory patent licensing avoids the
waste associated with exclusive control by requiring that a pioneer
patentee not appropriate for himself the information labored on by
improvement inventors.
The United States, by granting pioneer patentees an expansive right to
exclude, is allowing the monopoly of the patent to extend beyond the
rights that the patent grant justifiably bestows upon the pioneer. Courts
should not shy away from using compulsory patent licensing as a remedy
for antitrust violations. However, the best solution to the problem of
compulsory patent licensing in the context of improvement patents would
involve legislative reform. It would be one thing to say only whether the
lack of compulsory patent licensing in the context of improvement patents
is inconsistent with labor theory. However, to affirmatively argue that the
current system needs to be changed is somewhat more bold.
If it is true that labor theory calls for compulsory patent licensing in the
face of improvement patents, then one might inquire as to the limitations
that labor theory places on compulsory patent licensing of improvement
patents. Although labor theory does not require as much value be added by
the improvement patent as does the permissive TRIPs compulsory license
provisions, the author is sensitive that some concessions will need to be
made if any legislative reform is to come forward. The tendency of the law
to shy away from compulsory patent license, even in the antitrust arena,
proves as much. Whatever the outcome, should any legislation that
provides for more compulsory patent licensing in the area of improvement
patents be enacted in the United States, it will help ensure the just reward
to inventors that Locke envisioned.

